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Abstract 
Lie detection research has typically focused on reports about a single event.  However, in many 
forensic and security contexts, suspects are likely to report on several events, some of them may 
be untruthful. This presents interviewers with the challenge of detecting which reports are true 
and which are not.  Varying question format in a second interview, we examined differences in 
liars’ and truth-tellers’ statement inconsistency about two events. One hundred and fifty 
participants viewed a meeting in which a non-critical and a critical event were discussed. Truth-
tellers were instructed to be honest in their reports about both events, whereas liars had to lie 
about the critical event. In the first interview, all participants provided a free recall account. In a 
second interview, participants either gave another free recall account or responded to specific 
questions presented sequentially (concerning one event at a time) or non-sequentially 
(concerning both events simultaneously). Liars’ accounts featured more repetitions than truth-
tellers for both events, particularly in response to questions presented in non-sequential order. 
The implications for the use of this question format are discussed. 
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Suspects’ Consistency in Statements Concerning Two Events  
when Different Question Formats are Used 
Lie detection research has typically focused on reports about a single event.  However, in 
many forensic and security contexts, investigators may interrogate suspects about more than one 
event. This may be especially the case with police informants who often offer multiple pieces of 
information, some of which may be unreliable (Harfield, 2012; Stabile, 2014). Informants may 
provide inaccurate information to receive rewards (e.g. money, legal status or permanent 
residence permit), seek revenge from a competitor, or escape incarceration (Harfield, 2012; 
McGarrell, Freilich, & Chermak, 2007; Miller, 2011). In terrorist cases, informants may lie to 
investigators about the details of a planned terrorist attack or about a terrorist’s identity (Greer, 
1995; Stabile, 2014). Despite informants not always providing truthful information, investigators 
continue to use informants in criminal and terrorist cases as they are considered vital and cost-
effective sources of information in unresolved cases (Innes, 2000; Maguire & John, 1995; 
Stabile, 2014). Hence, it is important to explore interrogation techniques that may assist law 
enforcement agencies to effectively distinguish between truthful and deceptive informants when 
an interview involves questioning about more than one event. 
Inconsistency is frequently cited by investigators as the most useful cue for detecting lies 
in suspect statements (Strömwall & Granhag, 2003). In repeated statements, information is 
typically considered inconsistent if subsequent statements include few repetitions, omissions 
(details provided in an earlier statement but not in a subsequent statement), reminiscences 
(details provided in a subsequent statement but not in an earlier statement), and/or contradictions 
(conflicting details across statements; Fisher, Brewer, & Mitchell, 2009; Granhag, Strömwall & 
Jonsson, 2003; Vredeveldt, van Koppen, & Granhag, 2014).  
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In an examination of truth-tellers’ and liars’ inconsistency across multiple interviews, 
Granhag, Strömwall, and colleagues found that when statements regarding a single event were 
repeated over time, liars were equally or less inconsistent than truth-tellers (e.g., Granhag & 
Strömwall, 2002; Granhag et al., 2003). These findings negate the consistency heuristic which 
assumes that liars provide inconsistent statements whereas truth-tellers provide consistent 
statements (Strömwall & Granhag, 2003). Granhag and colleagues interpreted these findings in 
light of a ‘repeat versus reconstruct’ hypothesis. This hypothesis postulates that liars prepare and 
rehearse their responses before the first interview. When they are interviewed again, liars attempt 
to repeat those responses to maintain their statement consistency which they assume gives an 
impression of honesty. In contrast, truth-tellers do not rely on rehearsing and repeating their 
responses but instead rely on their memory of the event. Therefore, truthful statements across 
interviews are more likely to appear inconsistent because, as a function of natural remembering, 
some information in a repeated interview may be different.  For example, truth-tellers may add 
extra information (reminiscences) or forget some information (i.e. omissions; Fisher et al., 2009).  
The rehearsal strategy used by liars may be counteracted by asking questions in a 
different format across interviews (Leins, Fisher, & Vrij, 2012). Liars should find it more 
difficult to respond to a changed question format, because they have not experienced or encoded 
the relevant event, so more inconsistencies are likely to emerge in their statements. To test this 
hypothesis, Leins et al. (2012) asked interviewees to respond in different modes, (either verbally 
or pictorially) across two interviews. Liars were more inconsistent (provided significantly fewer 
repetitions and more contradictions) than truth-tellers when they reported their statements in 
different modes but not when they reported their statements verbally or pictorially only; no 
significant differences were found for reminiscences and omissions. Leins and colleagues also 
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explored the strategies participants used to appear credible during the interview. Eighty eight 
percent of the liars reported that they used consistency during the second interview, whereas only 
42% of the truth-tellers reported using this strategy. Hence, even though liars attempted to 
maintain consistency, they failed to achieve that when the interview format was changed. 
In another study, interviewees were asked to report an event in chronological order and 
then again in reverse order to the same or to a different interviewer (Shaw et al., 2014). Liars 
provided significantly fewer repetitions than truth-tellers but only when the interviewer was 
changed in the second interview. When this reverse order technique was used with non-native 
speakers in the presence of an interpreter, liars repeated the same number of details but 
reminisced significantly fewer details than truth-tellers (Ewens, Vrij, Mann, & Leal, 2015).  
These studies demonstrate that asking questions in a different format across repeated 
interviews about a single event increases inconsistencies in liar’ statements but not in truth-
tellers’ statements. In the present study, we devised a strategic questioning approach to assess 
inconsistencies across statements when a suspect is interviewed about two or more events.  
Specifically, suspects were asked in the first interview to provide separate free recall accounts on 
witnessed discussions about a non-critical event and about a critical event. Truth-tellers were 
instructed to report both events truthfully, whereas liars were asked to tell the truth about the 
non-critical event and to lie about the critical event. This procedure simulated real life scenarios 
in which deceptive informants report a mixture of true and false information so that their 
responses are believed by investigators (Maguire & John, 1995; Stabile, 2014). Informants 
typically strive to appear credible, so they may volunteer trivial information the investigator 
already knows (Rosenfeld, Jacobs, & Wright, 2003). To simulate this situation, we required liars 
in the current study to tell the truth about one of the events (the non-critical event that concerned 
SUSPECTS’ CONSISTENCY IN STATEMENTS  6 
 
less important information than the critical event and about which the interviewer was already 
informed).  
In the second interview, participants were required to produce further free recall accounts 
for both events or were asked a series of specific questions for details of the events. Questions 
were asked either (i) separately about each event with the order of questioning following the 
order of the witnessed events (sequentially ordered questions), or (ii) simultaneously about both 
events with the order of questioning not following the order of the witnessed event (non-
sequentially ordered questions). In line with previous findings regarding change in question 
format, these specific questions were expected to increase statement inconsistency for liars more 
than for truth-tellers. The free recall account would be easy for liars as they already provided the 
account in the first interview. Also, free recall accounts allow liars to be vague and evasive 
(Granhag & Strömwall, 1999; Hartwig et al., 2011). Specific questions, on the other hand, 
require suspects to provide specific responses (Evans & Fisher, 2011) which liars find more 
difficult than truth-tellers, particularly if liars have not experienced the event on which they are 
reporting. More precisely, the non-sequentially ordered questions were expected to disrupt 
reliance on sequentially rehearsed responses and to exhaust the cognitive resources of liars which 
further increase the differences between liars’ and truth-tellers’ statement inconsistency.   
We predicted that when liars tell the truth (i.e., discussing the non-critical event twice), 
they would be as consistent as truth-tellers in their statements. The predicted consistency in 
truth-tellers’ statements is based on the eyewitness recall literature. Truthful witnesses tend to be 
more consistent when they are asked the same questions across interviews than when they are 
asked different questions (for an overview, see Fisher et al., 2009). Hence, we expected that all 
participants recalling the non-critical event to be more inconsistent when they were asked 
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specific questions than when they were asked to repeat a free recall. The non-sequentially 
ordered questions reflect a more drastic change in the interview format, so we expected 
participants in the non-sequentially ordered questions condition to be the most inconsistent and 
those in the free recall condition to be the least inconsistent when reporting about the non-critical 
event (Hypothesis 1).  
As for the critical event about which liars provided false information, we predicted that 
liars and truth-tellers would not differ significantly with respect to statement inconsistency when 
they are asked the questions in the same format in both interviews (i.e. free recall), especially 
that all participants had the chance to prepare their statements prior to the interviews. When 
questions are asked in a different format, liars can no longer use the rehearsed responses or 
repeat responses they provided in a previous interview (for a review, see Fisher, Vrij, & Leins, 
2013). Hence, we expected liars to become significantly more inconsistent than truth-tellers 
when reporting about the critical event if the question format is changed between the interviews, 
particularly when the question format in the second interview is dramatically different to that in 
the first interview (i.e. in the non-sequentially ordered questions condition; Hypothesis 2).  
We examined within-subjects differences among liars and truth-tellers. We expected 
truth-tellers’ performance on inconsistency to be the same for the critical and non-critical events. 
As lying is more cognitively demanding than truth-telling (Vrij, 2008), we expected liars to be 
more inconsistent when they lied about the critical event than when they told the truth about the 
non-critical event (Hypothesis 3).  
We were also interested in examining the strategies that suspects use when reporting 
about two events to convince the interviewer that their statement is credible. When interviewed 
multiple times, liars typically attempt to maintain consistency to appear credible (Leins et al., 
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2012). Hence, we predicted that liars would be more likely than truth-tellers to report using 
consistency across interviews for both events as a strategy to convince the interviewer of their 
responses (Hypothesis 4).  
Method 
Participants and Design 
A total of 150 participants (68 males, 82 females, Mage = 25.3 years, SDage = 8.86) were 
recruited through the departmental participant pool and announcements posted in the university 
buildings, via email and on the university intranet. Participants received a reward of either a 
participation credit or £5 for taking part in the research.  
A 2 (Veracity [truth-teller, liar]) × 3 (Second Interview Question Format [free recall, 
sequentially ordered, non-sequentially ordered]) between-subjects design was used. The 
dependent variables were the Number of Repetitions, Reminiscences, and Contradictions 
reported across both interviews for both critical and non-critical events. The Number of 
Omissions may be deduced from repetitions as fewer repetitions means more omissions. 
Participants were randomly assigned to the Veracity conditions (75 participants in each 
condition) and to the Second Interview Question Format conditions (50 participants in each 
condition). 
Materials 
A video of a 4-min Skype meeting was produced for the purpose of the study. The 
meeting was between three undercover agents named ‘Chief’, ‘Tiger’, and ‘Bird’. Each of them 
was given certain character features that were evident in their discussion: Chief made the 
decisions, Bird complained about those decisions, and Tiger was the enthusiastic agent who 
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often criticized Bird. The agents had two discussions about two separate events. The Skype 
meeting started with the agents discussing a non-critical event about a field trip to Prague to meet 
and collaborate with Czech agents. Then, they discussed a critical event about a potential 
terrorist attack in London. This discussion involved an exchange about how to plant a spying 
device in the workplace of the suspected terrorist under the guise of presenting a workshop.   
Procedure 
After participants signed the informed consent form, they were instructed to imagine that 
they worked as undercover agents for an Intelligence Agency and that they were authorized to 
view a confidential Skype meeting between three undercover agents who work for the Agency. 
They had to pay attention to everything in the meeting as they were to be interviewed about the 
meeting afterwards. The experimenter waited outside the room while the participants viewed the 
meeting video. Participants were then randomly assigned to either the truth-teller or liar 
condition. Truth-tellers read on the computer screen that there was a spy working in the Agency, 
and this alleged spy aimed to protect the terrorist and stop the three agents from tracking him. As 
the Agency suspected that the spy was able to trace the online meeting, the participant was to be 
interviewed to know what information might have leaked. Therefore, participants needed to 
report everything that happened as honestly as possible so that the interviewer would not 
conclude they were hiding relevant information.  
Liars read similar instructions, but they were informed that they would be interviewed by 
the alleged spy. The Agency wanted to check if the alleged spy would act on any information the 
participant might reveal. If the alleged spy acted on that information, it would be clear that this 
person works for the terrorist. Hence, participants had to convince the alleged spy they were 
telling the truth in the following manner: They were to give an honest impression by telling the 
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truth about the first (non-critical) event about Prague which the spy knew about and which was 
not considered to include significant information. The second (critical) event, however, included 
very sensitive information, so they had to lie about it. As the alleged spy might possess 
information that the agents were trying to track the suspected terrorist, participants were asked to 
discuss the spying device but not to reveal the true details regarding how and where it will be 
planted. Therefore, they needed to fabricate another story in which the spying device would be 
planted elsewhere. We instructed liars which event to lie about so that all liars’ stories would be 
similar (as would be the case for all truth tellers’ stories). Moreover, these instructions helped 
liars to fabricate a ‘believable lie’. 
After participants read the instructions, the experimenter verbally clarified the 
instructions, and reiterated that, to receive the reward, participants needed to convince the 
interviewer they are being honest. This instruction has been used in many lie detection studies to 
simulate motivation in real suspect interviews by prompting interviewees, especially liars, to try 
to convince the interviewer that they are being truthful (e.g. Vrij et al., 2009). Participants were 
given as much time as they needed to prepare for the interview. 
One of four interviewers, blind to the participants’ veracity condition, and to the study 
hypotheses interviewed the participants. In the first interview, all participants were asked to give 
a detailed free recall about what each of the agents said about the non-critical event followed by 
another request to give a free recall about what each agent said about the critical event. This 
request for a free recall account simulates the information gathering approach used by 
investigators (Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010). At the end of this interview, participants were 
asked to think back and to try and remember any details they might have missed. After 
participants provided their statements, the interviewer gave them a crossword puzzle to complete 
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and apologized for having to leave the room. Participants worked on this filler task for 10 
minutes. 
Afterwards, the same interviewer conducted the second interview in which participants 
were randomly assigned to the free recall condition, sequentially ordered questions condition, or 
non-sequentially ordered questions condition. Those in the free recall condition were again asked 
to freely recall as much as they could about each discussed event. Participants in the sequentially 
ordered questions condition were asked questions about what each of the agents said in the non-
critical event followed by the same questions about the critical event. Participants in the non-
sequentially ordered questions condition responded to questions alternating between the critical 
and non-critical events (See Appendix for the questions asked). At the end of this interview, all 
participants were prompted to think back and to try and remember any details they might have 
missed.   
Participants then completed a post-interview questionnaire that assessed their motivation 
to convince the interviewer of their responses on a 7-point Likert scale (1= not motivated at all to 
7 = very motivated). They also responded to an open-ended question on the strategy they used to 
make their responses credible across interviews. Participants were then fully debriefed and 
thanked.  
Coding 
All interviews were transcribed and then coded by one rater. Every noun, verb, adjective, 
or adverb that interviewees used to describe what an agent said was marked as a single detail. 
These details were categorized for each agent such that each detail referred to one of the agents. 
For example, the statement ‘the Chief was telling them that the terrorist’s brother works on a 
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train’ contains five details (Chief, terrorist, brother, works, train) that are ascribed to the agent 
Chief. All details mentioned more than once, including the agents’ names, were coded only once 
in any single interview. When it was not clear to which agent the details referred to, the details 
were coded as ‘unspecified’ details. Details repeated in the second interview were coded as 
Repetitions, details that were mentioned in the first interview but not in the second interview 
were coded as Omissions, details that were mentioned in the second interview but not in the first 
interview were coded as Reminiscences, and details in the second interview that contradicted 
relevant details in the first interview were coded as Contradictions.   
A second rater blind to the experimental conditions and to the study hypotheses coded the 
responses of 24 participants (20% of the total sample). The rater started by coding interviews 
with four participants, and disagreements with the first rater were discussed and resolved. Then, 
the rater coded the responses of the remaining 20 participants. An inter-rater reliability analysis 
revealed that the Intra-class Correlations (ICC) were .97 for Repetitions, .92 for Omissions, .85 
for Reminiscences, and .57 for Contradictions.  
We were interested in liars’ strategies when they report truthful and false information 
about separate events. Hence, two raters coded participants’ responses to the post-interview 
question on the strategy they used to appear credible during the interview.  Strategies were coded 
into general categories which were data driven (i.e. not predetermined).   
Truth tellers’ responses were categorized into five categories, and liars’ responses were 
categorized into six categories. The categories that emerged for truth tellers were: (a) providing 
details (e.g., ‘I tried to include as much information as possible’), (b) being honest (e.g., ‘I just 
told the truth about what I have seen’), (c) reporting in chronological order (e.g., ‘I tried to 
remember everything in sequence’), (d) using memory enhancement strategies (e.g ‘I put myself 
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in the agent’s position to be able to connect the information’), and (e) maintaining consistency 
(e.g., ‘I tried to be consisted in the information I delivered’). 
For liars, the categories that emerged were: (a) maintaining consistency (e.g., 'I hesitated 
when asked about the trip to Prague so that if I hesitated when asked about the spy mission, it 
might not sound so obviously different to the usual way in which I answered questions’), (b) 
appearing truthful (e.g., ‘I tried to keep some details that were in the actual discussion’), (c) 
providing details (e.g., ‘I gave as many details and reasons as possible for the agents’ actions’), 
(d) keeping the story simple (e.g., ‘Don’t over explain things; try to keep it easy to remember’), 
and (e) rehearsing (e.g., ‘I practiced what I thought the conversation would be before going into 
the interview’). The sixth category labeled ‘Other’ included strategies that did not fit into the 
other five categories and that were reported by fewer than four participants (e.g., ‘Look him to 
the eye’).  A second rater allocated the responses to these categories. Inter-rater reliability was 
high (ICC = .84). Disagreements between the raters were discussed and resolved.  
Results 
A manipulation check revealed that participants were highly motivated to convince the 
interviewer that they were telling the truth (M = 5.56, SD = 1.23, on a 7-point Likert scale). A 
two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Veracity and Second Interview Question Format as 
the independent variables and rated motivation as the dependent variable did not reveal 
significant differences between truth-tellers (M = 5.72, SD = 1.11) and liars (M = 5.40, SD = 
1.34), F(1,144) = 2.54, p = .113, d = 0.26, 95% CI [0.07, 0.46]. Similarly, motivation was not 
significantly different between participants in the Free Recall condition (M = 5.34, SD = 1.22), in 
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the Sequentially Ordered Questions condition (M = 5.72, SD = 1.23), and in the Non-sequentially 
Ordered Questions condition (M = 5.62, SD = 1.24), F(2,144) = 1.28, p = .28, Cohen’s f = .14. 
Hypotheses Testing 
Contradictions and reminiscences
1
 did not occur frequently enough to be analysed, as 
shown in Table 1. Hence, we could not analyse Contradictions and Reminiscences, so the 
relevant hypotheses could not be tested and we only report the results for Repetitions.  
Table 1 about here 
The Number of Details provided at Interview 1 may have affected the Number of 
Repetitions at Interview 2. That is, the more Details provided at Interview 1, the more 
opportunities for Repetitions to occur. Hence, we calculated the repetitions proportion scores 
(Number of Repetitions for the critical or the non-critical event at Interview 2/Number of Details 
for the critical or the non-critical event at Interview 1) to take into account the Number of Details 
at Interview 1. The average Number of Details provided at Interview 1 regarding the non-critical 
event was 33.75 (SD = 10.80) for truth-tellers and 27.95 (SD = 9.84) for liars. As for the critical 
event, truth-tellers provided an average of 43.65 Details (SD = 12.46), whereas liars provided an 
                                                          
1
 Reminiscences comprised only 11% of the total number of details for the critical and non-
critical events. When we ran an ANOVA with Veracity and Second Interview Question Format 
as the independent variables and Reminiscences for each of the critical and non-critical events as 
the dependent variable, we found significant main effects for Veracity and Second Interview 
Question Format on Reminiscences regarding the non-critical event but not regarding the critical 
event. We believe that these results are due to the small number of reminiscences. The Veracity 
main effect regarding the non-critical event revealed that participants in the truth-telling 
condition provided more Reminiscences than those in the lying condition, F (1, 144) = 5.74, p = 
.018. As for Question Format regarding the non-critical event, the Non-sequentially Ordered 
Questions produced significantly more Reminiscences than the Sequentially Ordered Questions 
and the Free Recall, F (2, 144) = 5.15, p = .007.  
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average of 37.48 Details (SD = 14.11) at Interview 1. Analyses using the Repetitions proportion 
scores yielded similar results as the analyses using raw frequencies. We report the data for the 
raw frequencies because they are more informative. Also, the proportion scores can be inferred 
from these scores. The analyses for the critical and the non-critical events are presented 
separately, because liars only lied about the critical event (they told the truth about the non-
critical event).  
Table 2 about here 
Non-critical event. We conducted a 2 (Veracity) × 3 (Second Interview Question 
Format) ANOVA on the non-critical event data with the Number of Repetitions between the first 
Free Recall interview and the second interview as the dependent variable. Veracity, F(1, 144) = 
15.25, p < .001, Cohen’s f = .31, and Second Interview Question Format, F(2, 144) = 5.80, p = 
.004, Cohen’s f = .27, showed a significant main effect, but no interaction effect emerged, F(2, 
144) = 0. 06, p = .942, Cohen’s f = .03. As Table 2 shows, liars unexpectedly provided fewer 
Repetitions than truth-tellers, d = 0.62, 95% CI [0.29, 0.95].  
Planned comparisons revealed that the Non-sequentially Ordered Questions (M = 21.22, 
SD = 8.22) elicited significantly fewer Repetitions than the Free Recall (M = 27.50, SD = 11.93), 
t(98) = 3.07, p = .003, d = 0.61, 95% CI [0.21, 1.01]. The Sequentially Ordered Questions (M = 
22.92, SD = 9.27) did not elicit a significantly different Number of Repetitions than the Non-
sequentially Ordered Questions, t(98) = 0.97, p = .334, d = 0.19, 95% CI [-0.20, 0.59], or the 
Free Recall, t(98) = 2.14, p = .053, d = 0.43, 95% CI [0.03, 0.83]. These findings on the Second 
Interview Question Format are in line with Hypothesis 1, which predicted that statement 
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inconsistency will be highest in the Non-sequentially Ordered Questions condition and lowest in 
the Free Recall condition. 
Figure 1 about here 
Critical event. A 2 (Veracity) × 3 (Second Interview Question Format) ANOVA on the 
critical event data, with the Number of Repetitions as the dependent variable, revealed a 
significant main effect for Veracity, F(1, 144) = 32.85, p < .001, Cohen’s f = .46, and for Second 
Interview Question Format, F(2, 144) = 5.50, p = .005, Cohen’s f = .25. As Table 2 shows, truth-
tellers provided significantly more Repetitions than liars, d = 0.91, 95% CI [0.57, 1.25].   
Regarding the Second Interview Question Format main effect, planned comparisons 
revealed that Non-sequentially Ordered Questions (M = 24.72, SD = 10.32) elicited significantly 
fewer Repetitions than the Free Recall (M = 31.14, SD = 13.15), t(98) = 2.72, p = .008, d = 0.54, 
95% CI [0.14, 0.94]. The Sequentially Ordered Questions (M = 26.54, SD = 9.13) did not elicit a 
significantly different Number of Repetitions than the Non-sequentially Ordered Questions, t(98) 
= 0.93, p = .352, d = 0.19, 95% CI [-0.21, 0.58], or the Free Recall, t(98) = 2.03, p = .068, d = 
0.41, 95% CI [0.01, 0.80]. 
No interaction effect emerged between Veracity and Second Interview Question Format, 
F(2,144) = 0.90, p = .409, Cohen’s f = .10. However, this interaction effect was not an 
appropriate test for Hypothesis 2, because the interaction statistic (p = .409) may refer to any 
type of interaction. As we predicted a directional effect with specific group differences based on 
evidence from previous studies, a more informative test of Hypothesis 2 is to statistically test for 
significant differences between truth tellers and liars in each of the three experimental conditions 
and to compare the groups’ effect sizes to understand the magnitude of differences in each of the 
three different truth-lie comparisons (for a review on the importance of effect sizes compared to 
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significant effects, see du Prel, Hommel, Röhrig, & Blettner, 2009; Fritz, Morris & Richler, 
2012). The larger the magnitude, the easier it is for investigators to spot the differences between 
liars and truth-tellers. Hence, for the purpose of our study, the magnitude of the effects play a 
more important role than the significance of the effects. 
Univariate analyses that compared liars and truth-tellers in each Question Format 
condition were conducted. The results are presented in Table 2. The truth-lie differences were 
significant in all three comparisons, particularly in the Non-sequentially Ordered Questions 
condition, d = 1.48, 95% CI [0.86, 2.11], PS = 85. The effect size for Cohen’s d may be small 
(.20), medium (.50), or large (.80; Cohen, 1992). The effect size for this condition was very 
large, so the differences between liars and truth-tellers could be more easily detected in this 
condition compared to the Sequentially Ordered Questions condition, d = 0.85, 95% CI [0.27, 
1.42], PS = 75, and to the Free Recall condition, d = 0.68, 95% CI [0.11, 1.25], PS = 68. The 
Sequentially Ordered Questions condition and the Free Recall condition also showed a large 
effect, but not as large as the Non-Sequentially Ordered Questions condition. Moreover, the 
lower confidence interval limit of the effect size of Non-Sequentially Ordered Questions 
condition was far from zero and considerably higher than the two other Question Format 
conditions, which further corroborates our findings. Also in line with this finding, the probability 
of superiority (PS) or “the percentage of occasions when a randomly sampled member of the 
distribution with the higher mean will have a higher score than a randomly sampled member of 
the other distribution” (Fritz et al., 2012, p. 8) was larger for the Non-Sequentially Ordered 
Questions condition compared to the two other Question Format conditions. Figure 2 further 
shows that liars’ scores in the Non-Sequentially Ordered Questions condition were lower than 
liars’ scores in the other conditions and also substantially lower than truth-tellers’ scores in the 
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Non-Sequentially Ordered Questions condition. These results supported Hypothesis 2, which 
posited that differences in statement inconsistency between liars and truth-tellers would be most 
pronounced in the Non-sequentially Ordered Questions condition and least pronounced in the 
Free Recall condition.  
Figure 2 about here 
We conducted a follow-up discriminant analysis with the Veracity groups as the 
classifying variable and Repetitions for the critical event as the independent variable to 
understand how accurately Non-sequentially Ordered Questions could classify liars and truth-
tellers based on Repetitions. The analysis revealed that 84% of liars and 72% of truth-tellers 
could be classified correctly by the Non-sequentially Ordered Questions, χ2(1) = 21.49, Wilk’s 
Lambda = 0.64, p < .001, which is more than could be classified correctly by the Sequentially 
Ordered Questions (72% of liars and 68% of truth-tellers) and the Free Recall (68% of liars and 
48% of truth-tellers).  
Comparing repetitions for the critical and non-critical events among liars and truth-
tellers. We ran separate within-subjects ANOVAs for liars and truth-tellers with Event (non-
critical, critical) as the independent variable and Repetitions as the dependent variable to 
compare Repetitions for the non-critical and critical events within each Veracity group. Truth-
tellers provided more Repetitions when they reported about the critical event than when they 
reported about the non-critical event, F(1, 74) = 26.42, p < .001, d = 0.51, 95% CI [0.18, 0.83]. 
Liars’ Repetitions for the critical and the non-critical events were not significantly different, F(1, 
74) = 3.51, p = .065, d = 0.20, 95% CI [-0.12, 0.52]. Thus, Hypothesis 3, which postulated that 
liars would be more inconsistent when they report about the critical event than when they report 
about the non-critical event, was not supported. 
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Table 3 about here 
Reported Strategies. Table 2 shows the frequency of occurrence of each strategy used 
by liars and truth-tellers. More than half of the truth-tellers attempted to provide as many details 
as they could to convince the interviewer they were innocent. We were particularly interested in 
the ‘consistency strategy’. This strategy was reported by only 8% of the truth tellers. Amongst 
liars, this was the most frequently reported strategy with 45% of liars reporting having used that 
strategy. This indicates that half of the liars responded according to the consistency heuristic and 
attempted to remain consistent across interviews for each event as well as across events so that 
the interviewer believes they are truthful. The consistency strategy was used significantly more 
by liars than by than truth-tellers, χ2 (7) = 138.99, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .778, which supported 
Hypothesis 4.  
Discussion 
The present study examined whether asking questions in a non-sequential order about 
two events would elicit cues to deceit in terms of statement consistency. All participants told the 
truth about a non-critical event, but liars had to fabricate new details about a critical event. 
Across interviews, truth-tellers repeated more details than liars for the critical event. We 
predicted that for the critical event the differences in repetitions between liars and truth-tellers 
would be most pronounced in the non-sequentially ordered questions condition and least 
pronounced in the free recall condition. Hence, we were interested in the magnitude of the 
difference between truth-tellers’ and liars’ repetitions in each of the question format conditions. 
Our results revealed that truth-tellers repeated more details than liars across all question format 
conditions, but the non-sequentially ordered questions revealed the highest effect size (d = 1.48) 
compared to the sequentially ordered questions and to the free recall. This is in line with 
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previous research on lie detection which demonstrated that liars become less consistent than 
truth-tellers when a change in question format is introduced in the interview (e.g. Leins et al., 
2012; Shaw et al., 2014).  
The discriminant analysis corroborated these findings. Non-sequentially ordered 
questions showed the highest correct classification rate (78%) compared to the other two 
question formats. Hence, asking non-sequentially ordered questions in a second interview is a 
better strategy in reducing liars’ consistency and in accurately classifying liars from truth-tellers 
than asking sequentially ordered questions or requesting a free recall.  
Interestingly, liars (who were asked to lie about the critical event but to tell the truth 
about the non-critical event) repeated fewer details than truth-tellers for the non-critical event. 
This is in contrast with our prediction that liars would perform the same as truth-tellers when 
they truthfully report about the non-critical event. It might be that liars were cognitively loaded 
because they had to recall two events and -unlike truth-tellers- lie about one of the events. It is 
possible that liars’ cognitive resources are depleted when they have to lie about one of the 
events, and as a result, it becomes difficult for them to maintain consistency. However, the liars’ 
reported strategies provides another explanation for this finding. Approximately 45% of liars 
indicated that they tried to maintain consistency across interviews about both events. They 
actually achieved this as the within-subjects analyses indicated. Many liars reported that they 
thought it will be difficult to remain consistent when deceptively answering questions about the 
critical event. Therefore, they adopted the strategy of providing fewer repetitions for the non-
critical event to lower their ‘baseline consistency’. Applying this strategy, the number of 
repetitions they provided when they lied (regarding the critical event) would match the number 
of repetitions they provided when they told the truth. Nonetheless, these repeated details were 
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fewer than those provided by truth-tellers. These two explanations do not necessarily contradict 
each other, because the increased cognitive load and the deliberate strategy may be occurring 
simultaneously. Even though liars attempted to maintain consistency across events, they may as 
well have found it difficult to lie about one of the two events, which further decreased their 
consistency levels. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
We could not analyze reminiscences and contradictions in our study because they did not 
occur frequently enough to be analyzed. Previous studies on lie detection have also reported that 
contradictions could not be analyzed for the same reason (e.g., Ewens et al., 2015; Granhag & 
Strömwall, 2002). The very few reminiscences in our study might be explained by the difficulty 
of the task for participants, because they had to report about two events. The literature on 
reminiscences corroborates these findings, because cognitive interference inhibits individuals 
from providing additional information (Erdelyi, 1996; Ewens et al., 2015). Even though specific 
questions are more likely to increase reminiscences than a free recall (Fisher et al., 2009), it 
appears that increasing the difficulty of the questions by asking about two events rather than one 
event may interrupt memory retrieval and impede reminiscences. As previous research on 
reminiscences in the eyewitness and lie detection literatures demonstrated, reminiscences are 
characteristic of truth-tellers’ statements rather than of liars’ statement, so researchers in both 
fields may further examine reminiscences amongst innocent suspects when more than one event 
is reported.  
It is worth noting that we deliberately did not counterbalance the order of the discussed 
events. We introduced the critical event after the non-critical event, because liars find it more 
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difficult to start responding truthfully and then to lie rather than vice versa (Vrij, Leal, Mann, & 
Fisher, 2012). We also presented the non-sequentially ordered questions in the same order with 
questions about the non-critical event followed by the same questions about the critical event. 
Hence, liars might have been able to predict the nature of subsequent questions as the interview 
progressed. Non-sequentially ordered questioning may become more effective if the nature and 
order of the questions are varied within an interview. For example, the interviewer may ask 
questions about what each person said during each event as well as about the events’ details, 
including temporal and spatial details (which are details that suspects do not anticipate they will 
be asked; Vrij et al., 2009).  
Participants viewed a Skype discussion and were asked to recall it and/or distort some of 
the details. This may not reflect real criminal cases because informants are often more involved 
in overheard discussions, so this might have affected the ecological validity of our study. Even 
though we aimed to examine overheard discussions by informants, it is important for future 
studies to investigate how liars’ and truth-tellers’ statement consistency changes as a function of 
question format when they engage in the discussions themselves. In addition, sometimes 
informants engage in actions rather than discussions, so future studies might investigate 
consistency in reporting actions rather than discussions.  
Our findings suggest that liars adopt different strategies when they have to report about 
more than one event compared to only one event as it becomes more difficult for them to use a 
rehearse and repeat strategy (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999). Liars often incorporate lies and truths 
in a single account to make it easier to fabricate the lie (Leins, Fisher, & Ross, 2013), so their 
deliberation and cognitive load may increase when they have to report about two events, even 
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when one of the events is truthful. We found that non-sequentially ordered questions magnified 
the differences between liars and truth-tellers for two events, but we expect this questioning to be 
more effective when used for more than two events. However, more research is needed to further 
explore liars’ performance when they report about more than one event and when they tell the 
truth and lie in a single account.    
Lastly, the finding that liars were significantly less consistent than truth-tellers even when 
telling the truth was interesting. Liars seem to use the same strategy when they tell the truth and 
when they lie in a single interview. It may be that in investigative settings, suspects who provide 
few repetitions for all reported events may be lying about at least one of the events. Of course, in 
our experimental design the investigator knew the facts about the first discussed event, the non-
critical event. This may not always be the case in real life. However, in real life investigators 
may often be able to verify some of the information of one of the events discussed in a first 
interview and may reach the conclusion that the suspect was truthful when describing that event. 
As our findings show, suspects who provide only few repetitions and omit a large amount of 
information about this verified information in a subsequent interview may be suspected of lying 
about the other nonverifiable information. When asking non-sequentially ordered questions 
decreases repetitions, suspicion may be well justified as our discriminant analysis showed that 
this technique may help investigators accurately classify liars 78% of the time. Moreover, the 
large effect sizes we found when using non-sequentially ordered questions indicates that 
investigators can detect decreased consistency while they are conducting the interview.  
Non-sequentially ordered questions affect truth-tellers as much as liars. These questions 
disrupt the natural and chronological recall by truth-tellers and decrease their reporting accuracy, 
so they may not match proposed guidelines on good interviewing practice (Fisher et al., 2009; 
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Walsh, Oxburgh, Redlich, & Myklebust, 2015). However, our findings that truth-tellers were 
significantly more consistent than truth-tellers demonstrate that truth-tellers did not find 
responding to these questions as difficult as liars found them and they managed to repeat a good 
amount of information. Hence, these questions may be used in investigative contexts where 
investigators have sufficient bases to assume that the suspect may be deceptive or in contexts 
where possible deception is detrimental for the case.  
The current research is the first to investigate non-sequentially ordered questions when 
liars report about two events. The large effect size for repetitions when this non-sequentially 
ordered questions were used compared to a free recall or to sequentially ordered questions 
suggests that it is a promising interview technique for use with potentially unreliable informants. 
More research is needed on this technique to demonstrate its applied potential.  
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Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations of the Dependent Variables for the Non-critical and Critical 
Events  
 
 Truth Lie 
 M SD M SD 
Non-critical event    
  Repetitions 26.92 9.95 20.84 9.61 
  Omissions  6.40 4.03 6.64 3.95 
  Reminiscences  4.87 2.17 2.67 1.28 
  Contradictions  0.20 0.46 0.21 0.44 
 
Critical event 
    
  Repetitions 32.13 10.66 22.8 9.85 
  Omissions  10.91 6.43 13.84 7.35 
  Reminiscences  3.38 1.25 4.24 2.15 
  Contradictions  0.32 0.61 0.48 0.76 
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Table 2 
Repetitions for the Non-critical and Critical Events as a Function of Veracity and Second 
Interview Question Format 
 
 Truth Lie    
 M SD M SD F p d [95% CI] 
Non-critical event 
  Repetitions 
      
     Free recall  30.88 10.80 24.12 12.25 4.28 .044 0.59 [0.02, 1.15] 
     Sequential  25.64 9.66 20.20 8.17 4.63 .037 0.61 [0.04, 1.18] 
     Non-sequential  24.24 8.36 18.20 6.99 7.68 .008 0.78 [0.21, 1.36] 
    Total 26.92 9.95 20.84 9.61 15.25 <.001 0.62 [0.29, 0.95] 
 
Critical event 
  Repetitions 
       
     Free recall  35.40 12.79 26.88 12.31 5.76 .02 0.68 [0.11, 1.25] 
     Sequential  30.12 9.32 22.96 7.52 8.94 .004 0.85 [0.27, 1.42] 
     Non-sequential  30.88 9.12 18.56 7.42 27.46 <.001 1.48 [0.86, 2.11] 
     Total 32.13 10.66 22.80 9.85 32.85 <.001 0.91 [0.57, 1.25] 
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Table 3 
Frequency and Percentage of Occurrence of Strategies used by Truth-tellers and Liars to 
Convince the Interviewer of their Responses 
 
Category Frequency Percentage 
Truth-tellers   
 Providing details 38 51% 
 Being honest 24 32% 
 Reporting in chronological order 12 16% 
 Using memory enhancement strategies 9 12% 
 Maintaining consistency 6 8% 
Liars   
 Maintaining consistency 34 45% 
 Staying close to the truth 24 32% 
 Providing as much details as possible 13 17% 
 Keeping the story simple 8 11% 
 Rehearsing the lie 4 5% 
 Other 6 8% 
Note. The percentages are calculated for truth-tellers and liars separately. The total exceeds 
100% for each group because each participant could contribute to more than one category. 
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Figure 1. Comparisons of the number of repetitions provided by truth-tellers and liars in each of 
the Question Format Conditions for the Non-Critical Event  
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Figure 2. Comparisons of the number of repetitions provided by truth-tellers and liars in each of 
the Question Format Conditions for the Critical Event  
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Appendix 
Sequentially Ordered Questions 
1.Tell me in detail what Chief said when they were discussing the trip to Prague? 
2. Tell me in detail what Tiger said when they were discussing the trip to Prague? 
3. Tell me in detail what Bird said when they were discussing the trip to Prague? 
4. Tell me in detail what Chief said when they were discussing the spying mission against the 
terrorist? 
5. Tell me in detail what Tiger said when they were discussing the spying mission against the 
terrorist? 
6. Tell me in detail what Bird said when they were discussing the spying mission against the 
terrorist? 
Non-sequentially Ordered Questions 
1. Tell me in detail what Chief said when they were discussing the trip to Prague? 
2. Tell me in detail what Chief said when they were discussing the spying mission against the 
terrorist? 
3. Tell me in detail what Tiger said when they were discussing the trip to Prague? 
4. Tell me in detail what Tiger said when they were discussing the spying mission against the 
terrorist? 
5. Tell me in detail what Bird said when they were discussing the trip to Prague? 
6. Tell me in detail what Bird said when they were discussing the spying mission against the 
terrorist?” 
 
 
